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Credential Cartels: How Professional Licensing Boards Became Tools of Economic Exclusion

By Ahval Independent Investigative
Credential Cartels: How Professional Licensing Boards Became Tools of Economic Exclusion

Photo by Viktor Talashuk on Unsplash

In 2019, Fatuma Hassan arrived in Minneapolis with a skill she had practiced for two decades — hair braiding, a craft passed through generations of her family in Somalia. She opened a small studio, built a client base, and began working toward financial independence. Then the state informed her that she was operating illegally.

Minnesota, at the time, required hair braiders to obtain a cosmetology license — a credential that demanded up to 1,500 hours of classroom instruction, most of it covering chemical treatments, dyes, and salon techniques entirely unrelated to the natural braiding Hassan performed. The cost: several thousand dollars and roughly a year of her life.

Her story is not an outlier. It is a template.

A Growth Industry Built on Paperwork

In 1950, roughly one in twenty American workers needed a government-issued license to do their job. Today, that figure has climbed to nearly one in four — a transformation that has reshaped labor markets in ways that receive little public scrutiny. The Institute for Justice, a libertarian-leaning legal advocacy organization that has litigated dozens of licensing cases, estimates that the United States now imposes more than 1,800 distinct occupational licensing regimes across its fifty states.

The breadth is staggering. Interior designers in Florida must complete four years of education and pass a national exam. Louisiana has, at various points, required licenses for florists, tour guides, and monks selling hand-crafted caskets. In some states, eyebrow threaders face more regulatory hurdles than emergency medical technicians.

Public health and safety — the traditional justification for licensing — rarely explains this expansion. Independent analyses by economists at the Brookings Institution, the Obama White House Council of Economic Advisers, and the Federal Trade Commission have each concluded that many licensing requirements bear no measurable relationship to consumer protection outcomes. What they do correlate with, consistently, is higher prices and reduced competition in the licensed fields.

Who Writes the Rules — and Why

The mechanism driving this proliferation is not difficult to trace, though it receives surprisingly little press coverage. In most states, occupational licensing boards are dominated — often legally required to be dominated — by practitioners already working in the field they regulate. A cosmetology board staffed primarily by salon owners is asked to set entry standards for new salon owners. The structural conflict of interest is not incidental; in many cases, it is written directly into state statute.

These boards do not operate in a vacuum. Behind them sit trade associations, professional guilds, and industry lobbying operations that draft model legislation, fund state-level political campaigns, and cultivate relationships with the legislators who oversee regulatory committees. The pattern has been documented repeatedly: an established industry perceives a competitive threat — from immigrants with foreign credentials, from gig-economy platforms, from practitioners trained through non-traditional pathways — and responds by tightening licensing requirements just enough to raise the cost of entry for newcomers without affecting those already licensed.

A 2018 analysis by the National Conference of State Legislatures found that licensing bills introduced in state capitols were disproportionately sponsored by legislators who had received campaign contributions from the relevant trade associations in the preceding election cycle. The study stopped short of asserting causation but described the correlation as "consistent and notable."

The Immigrant and Low-Income Penalty

The workers most systematically disadvantaged by restrictive licensing are those with the least political leverage to fight back. Immigrants who arrive with professional training — nurses, engineers, teachers, skilled tradespeople — frequently discover that their foreign credentials are not recognized, and that re-credentialing requirements are both expensive and time-consuming. A 2020 report from the Migration Policy Institute found that approximately two million college-educated immigrants in the United States were working in jobs significantly below their qualification level, with licensing barriers cited as a primary structural cause.

For low-income Americans seeking upward mobility through skilled trades or entrepreneurship, the calculus is similarly punishing. A $3,000 licensing fee and a six-month training requirement may be trivial inconveniences for a middle-class career changer. For a single parent working two jobs, they can be prohibitive — effectively reserving entire occupational categories for those who already possess financial cushion.

Fatuma Hassan eventually benefited from a 2021 Minnesota law that exempted natural hair braiders from cosmetology licensing requirements — a reform that came only after years of litigation, legislative advocacy, and significant media attention. Many workers in similar circumstances have no such recourse.

Reform in the Margins

A small but growing coalition of reformers — crossing ideological lines in ways that are increasingly rare in American politics — has begun pushing back. Arizona enacted sweeping universal recognition legislation in 2019, requiring the state to accept out-of-state licenses in most professions without additional testing. Several other states have followed, though implementation has been uneven and incumbent industries have challenged the rules aggressively.

At the federal level, momentum has been episodic. The Department of Labor's occupational licensing reform initiative, launched under the Obama administration and continued with varying enthusiasm under subsequent administrations, has produced research and grant funding but no binding national standards.

What has not changed is the fundamental architecture: licensing boards staffed by incumbents, funded partly by licensing fees, and structurally positioned to favor restriction over access. Until that architecture is examined as directly as the credentials it issues, the barriers will remain — invisible to most, and costly to many.